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et al.: Panel: Title IX Revisited

The City University of New York Comments on
Proposed Department of Education Regulations to Implement Title IX
January 29, 2019
Interests of CUNY and Summary of Comments
The City University of New York (“CUNY” or “University”) is pleased to comment on the
Department of Education’s proposed regulations to implement Title IX. These comments focus
on how the proposed regulations would impact CUNY’s disproportionately low-income students
and its historic mission of enhancing access to higher education. They also consider the
practical implications of the proposed regulations on less well-resourced, public institutions of
higher education.
After careful analysis, CUNY concludes that the Department of Education’s proposed
regulations:
1) Unfairly narrow the definition of sexual harassment by requiring it to be both severe
and pervasive;
2) Unreasonably constrict the circumstances in which colleges may respond to sexual
harassment by requiring them to dismiss complaints regarding behavior that occurs
outside their educational programs or activities;
3) Improperly reduce the responsibility of colleges to investigate and sanction sexual
harassment by limiting liability to circumstances in which the Title IX coordinator or
president acquires actual knowledge of a complaint;
4) Impose the unequal clear and convincing standard of proof on some students subjected
to sexual harassment;
5) Mandate prohibitively costly, burdensome, and unwise grievance procedures for formal
resolution of complaints of sexual harassment;
6) Undermine the due process rights of students consenting to informal resolution by
allowing colleges to use any process at all; and
7) Contravene the purpose of Title IX to eliminate sex discrimination in federally funded
educational programs by turning the statute on its head.
As a result, CUNY concludes that the proposed regulations would weaken needed protections
for our students, impair our mission of access to higher education, drain limited public funding,
erode students’ due process rights, and degrade both safety and equality on our campuses.
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CUNY is an institution of enormous size and scale. It is the largest urban university system in the
United States, comprised of 25 institutions of higher education across New York City’s five
boroughs. Its eleven senior colleges, seven community colleges, and seven graduate, honors,
and professional schools enroll over a half million students.
CUNY’s diverse students overwhelmingly come from impoverished backgrounds. Sixty percent
of CUNY students come from families making less than $30,000 per year. They are 76%
students of color, 57% female, and 45% first generation in their families to attend college. Many
are immigrants or the children of immigrants, and almost 40% of CUNY students experience
food insecurity.
In 1961, the New York State Legislature defined CUNY’s mission as an urban, public higher
educational institution in the State of New York. In addition to emphasizing its commitment to
academic excellence, the state legislature emphasized CUNY’s mission to provide “equal access
and opportunity” for students “from all ethnic and racial groups,” and regardless of sex.1 It
underscored that CUNY has an educational agenda “of vital importance as a vehicle for the
upward mobility of the disadvantaged in the City of New York.”2
As a result of its mission to provide equal access to higher education for students from
disadvantaged communities, CUNY has a special interest in federal and state civil rights
legislation to ensure equality of educational opportunities. Title IX of the federal Education
Amendments Act of 1972 states:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.3
This statute means that educational institutions cannot discriminate against or exclude
students from educational opportunities on the basis of sex.
CUNY’s own mission mirrors the civil rights purpose of Title IX. The University’s promise of
enhancing educational “equal access and opportunity” for students from underserved
communities heightens CUNY’s commitment to the gender equality mandate in Title IX.
Sexual harassment and sexual assault are both serious problems on college campuses.4
According to research done by the Association of American Universities, 26% of senior females,
1

N.Y.S. Educ. Law, Art. 125, § 6201.

2

Id.

3

20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).

4

One-fifth to one-fourth of female students are sexually victimized while in college. NIJ, The Sexual Victimization of
College Women 10 (2000).
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6.3% of senior males, and 30% of seniors identifying as transgender have experienced
penetration or sexual touching by physical force or incapacitation since entering an institution
of higher education.5 About 60% of both female and male college students experience some
form of sexual harassment.6
Sexual harassment and sexual assault deny students equal educational opportunities. They are
associated with impaired academic outcomes, including “lower academic efficacy, higher stress,
lower institutional commitment, and lower scholastic conscientiousness.”7 CUNY’s own 2018
Sexual Violence Campus Climate Survey found that gender-based violence curtails our students’
ability to remain in classes and complete their degrees.8
Sexual assault disproportionately harms women; 84% of sexual assault and rape victims are
female.9 Sexual assault disproportionately harms lower income individuals as well. Forty-four
percent of sexual assault and rape victims come from families that make less than $25,000 per
year.10 When one compares the victimization data between the lowest and highest income
individuals, the comparison is even more extreme. Indeed, people with household incomes of
less than $7,500 experience 12 times the victimization rate as those with household incomes
greater than $75,000.11 Because CUNY students are disproportionately female and poor, they
are at greater risk for sexual assault over the course of their lifetimes.
The Department of Education’s proposed regulations would weaken Title IX review of colleges
under a deliberate indifference standard, require colleges to adopt onerous and expensive
grievance procedures, deter victims from reporting legitimate complaints of sexual harassment,
5

Assoc. Amer. Universities, Report on the AAU Campus Climate Survey on Sexual Assault and Sexual Misconduct xiii
(2015).

6

Amer. Assoc. Univ. Women, Drawing the Line: Sexual Harassment on Campus 18 (2005).

7

Victoria Banyard et al., Academic Correlates of Unwanted Sexual Contact, Intercourse, Stalking, and Intimate
Partner Violence, J. Interper. Viol. 11 (2017). Moreover, about 31% of rape victims and 7% of sexual battery victims
experienced worsened schoolwork or grades. BJS, Campus Climate Survey Validation Study 113-14 (2016). Eight
percent of rape victims and 2% of sexual battery victims dropped classes or changed their schedules. Id. An
additional 11% of rape victims and 4% of sexual battery victims wanted to drop classes or change their schedules.
Id.

8

See http://www1.cuny.edu/sites/title-ix/campus-websites/cunys-sexual-violence-campus-climate-survey/.

9

FiveThirtyEight, What We Know about Victims of Sexual Assault in America (citing BJS, National Crime
Victimization Survey (2017)).
10

Id.

11

Id. At the same time, people of color and immigrants victimized by sexual assault may be less likely to report
their experiences to authorities for cultural, social, and legal reasons, including fear of entanglement in
bureaucracy, cultural conditioning against questioning authority, and pressure to protect those who engage in
sexual misconduct. See, e.g., Pollard-Terry, For African-American Rape Victims, A Culture of Silence, L.A. Times, July
20, 2004.
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deter witnesses from participating in Title IX investigations, discourage colleges from actively
seeking information about sexual harassment, and erode the due process rights of both parties.
In so doing, they would undermine Title IX’s goal of eliminating sex discrimination in federally
funded educational programs. Because they would decrease safety and equality on our
campuses, CUNY opposes the proposed regulations.
COMMENTS ABOUT THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS
I.

The Department of Education’s Proposed Title IX Regulation § 106.44(e)(1)(ii),
Adopting a Narrow Definition of Sexual Harassment, Would Decrease Safety and
Equality on Our Campuses.

The proposed regulations’ use of the deliberate indifference standard in defining sexual
harassment would decrease our students’ protection from behavior that denies them equal
access to education.
Under the Department of Education’s prior guidance, the definition of sexual harassment that
triggered Title IX review was sexual conduct that was “sufficiently severe, pervasive, or
persistent so as to interfere with or limit a student’s ability to participate in or benefit from the
services, activities, or opportunities offered by a school.”12 Unwelcome conduct on the basis of
sex that was severe or pervasive would thus trigger Title IX review, as long as it denied a
student access to equal education.13
This definition of sexual harassment in education was consistent with the definition of sexual
harassment articulated by the Supreme Court in other civil rights contexts. For instance, in
Meritor Savings Bank, the Supreme Court defined sexual harassment in the workplace under
Title VII as follows: “for sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or
pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working
environment.’” 14
The Department of Education now proposes regulations that would change the “or” to an
“and” in the prior standard.15 The change from a disjunctive to a conjunctive phrase would
make a large difference in terms of the safety and equality of our students.
The proposed regulations would define sexual harassment as “unwelcome conduct on the basis
of sex that is so severe, pervasive and objectively offensive that it effectively denies a person

12

U.S. Dept. of Educ., OCR, Dear Colleague Letter: Harassment and Bullying 2 (2010) (withdrawn).

13

Id.

14

Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1986).

15

§ 106.44(e)(1)(ii).
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equal access to the recipient’s education program or activity.”16 The regulations would thereby
change three alternatives of “severe, pervasive or persistent” into three requirements of
“severe, pervasive and objectively offensive,” which would unfairly limit the scope of Title IX
protection. The proposed regulations would diminish institutional oversight in the educational
context to an unusual degree, one that is out of step with American workplaces and
comparable civil rights law.
Two examples of sexual harassment that should implicate Title IX, but would not do so under
the proposed regulations, illustrate the point:
Example 1: One day in a laboratory, a professor of chemistry whispers in a student’s ear
that he would like to have sex with her, and he uses profanity to describe what he
would like to do. The student is alarmed and drops out of the class as a result. The
behavior is “severe,” and it denies the student access to equal education. Nevertheless,
it happened only once, so is not “pervasive.” Under the proposed regulations, even if
the college had actual knowledge of the incident and chose to do nothing to restore the
student’s equal access to education, the student would have no claim under Title IX.
Example 2: A graduate assistant in a history class emails an undergraduate student
multiple times a week over a period of two months, commenting each time positively
and in detail on what the student wears and how she looks. The student feels
uncomfortable about the unwanted attention, tries to avoid the graduate assistant,
misses class, and eventually drops out of the class as a result. The persistent emails are
“pervasive,” and they deny the undergraduate access to an equal education.
Nevertheless, they would not be sufficiently “severe,” so under the proposed
regulations, even if the college had actual knowledge of the situation and chose to do
nothing to restore the student’s equal access to education, the student would have no
claim under Title IX.
These two examples show how the practical result of the proposed regulations would
contravene the goals of Title IX. Each would have come out differently under the Department of
Education’s prior guidance on Title IX.
The Department of Education now attempts to justify the change from “severe or pervasive” to
“severe and pervasive” by arguing that the administrative standard for assessing colleges’
actions under Title IX should align with the caselaw that limits the kind of behavior that could
subject an institution of higher education to a private cause of action for money damages.17
However, that caselaw does not suggest that severity and pervasiveness were or should both

16

Id. (emphasis added).

17

Commentary 1.A. at 19-29 (citing Gebser v. Lago Vista Ind. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992), and Davis v. Monroe Cty Bd.
of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999)).
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be required before the agency itself could review colleges in administrative enforcement
proceedings to effectuate the equality purpose of Title IX.
There is good reason not to extend the private cause of action analysis into administrative
agency review, because, as the two examples above illustrate, limiting agency oversight to
those circumstances would decrease safety and increase sexual inequality on college campuses.
Requiring both severity and pervasiveness would erect barriers to equal access to educational
opportunities, contrary to Title IX’s purpose.
The regulations should instead define sexual harassment to include severe or pervasive
unwelcome sexual behavior that denies a student access to equal education, whether or not
the behavior is both severe and pervasive. To ignore severe sexual harassment that denies a
student equal access to education, simply because it is not pervasive, would erode safety and
equality on our campuses. Likewise, to ignore pervasive sexual harassment that denies a
student equal opportunity, simply because it is not severe, would also erode safety and equality
on our campuses.
II.

The Department of Education’s Proposed Title IX Regulation § 106.44(a), Adopting
a Deliberate Indifference Standard for Recipient Responsibility Only When
Prohibited Conduct Occurs within Its Education Program or Activity, Would
Decrease Safety and Equality on Our Campuses.

The Department of Education’s proposed regulations would impose a new requirement that
the college is only responsible for responding to sexual harassment that occurs within its own
“education program or activity.”18 An “education program or activity” includes “any academic,
extracurricular, research, [or] occupational training.”19 The commentary to this proposed
regulation suggests that a college may be responsible for some of what happens off campus;20
however, because the vast majority of educational programs and activities happen on campus,
the proposed regulation would primarily limit Title IX coverage to behavior that occurs on
campus.
The majority of sexual victimizations of college students across the country occur off campus in
residential spaces.21 CUNY is no exception. CUNY serves more than half a million students,
including more than 270,000 degree-seeking students, but only about 3,000 of them reside in
CUNY-owned or operated residential housing. Because CUNY is made up of commuter
institutions, the vast majority of CUNY students live off campus and most social interactions
18

§ 106.44(a).

19

34 C.F.R. § 106.31.

20

Commentary 1.A, at 19-29 (citing Rost ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 Sch. Dist., 511 F.3d 1114, 1121 n.1
(10th Cir. 2008)).
21

NIJ, The Sexual Victimization of College Women 20 (2000).
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among students occur off campus. CUNY’s recent Climate Survey indicates that the vast
majority of CUNY students who experience sexual misconduct while enrolled at CUNY
experience it off campus.22
New York State’s “Enough is Enough” law, which applies to New York State institutions of
higher education, sets forth uniform policy and reporting requirements when there are
allegations of sexual violence. This law appropriately applies to conduct that occurs both on and
off campus.23
By contrast, the proposed Department of Education regulations would eliminate colleges’
responsibility for responding to sexual harassment and sexual assault that limit students’
educational opportunities when they occur outside colleges’ education programs or activities,
the very place where college students experience the majority of sexual assault.
The following example reveals a common result of the “education program or activity”
limitation in the proposed regulations:
Example: A male student goes to the private apartment of a classmate to study together
for an upcoming mathematics exam. At the apartment, the classmate plies the student
with alcohol and, when the student becomes incapacitated, the classmate sexually
assaults him. As a result of the trauma from that experience, the student retreats from
the math class and earns a failing grade. Under the proposed regulations, even if the
college had actual knowledge of the sexual assault by a classmate and its negative
educational consequences, and chose to do nothing to restore the student’s equal
access to education, because the incident occurred off campus and not within an
educational program or activity, the student would have no claim under Title IX.
The example would have come out differently under the Department of Education’s prior
guidance on Title IX and under New York State’s “Enough Is Enough” law.
The mere fact that an assault occurred off campus does not insulate a student from suffering
the continued effects of a hostile environment while on campus, especially when the assailant
is a member of the college community. The proposed regulations are blind to the effects of this
harmful, off campus behavior and its impact on the educational environment, which
contravenes Title IX.
Under the proposed regulations, the college would not be able to hold the student’s classmate
responsible for having sexually assaulted the student under Title IX, even though both students
are members of the same academic community, and even though the classmate’s sexual
22

See http://www1.cuny.edu/sites/title-ix/campus-websites/cunys-sexual-violence-campus-climate-survey/.

23

Article 129-B § 6440(6) (“The provisions of this article shall apply regardless of whether the violation occurs on
campus, off campus, or while studying abroad”).
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assault denied the student access to an equal education. As the proposed regulations mandate,
“If the conduct alleged by the complainant ... did not occur within the recipient’s program or
activity, the recipient must dismiss the formal complaint with regard to that conduct.”24
To ensure students’ safety, CUNY has to be able to take appropriate disciplinary action against
sexual assailants who live, work, or study on its campuses. The proposed regulations arbitrarily
and unreasonably hobble schools’ ability to take necessary action when misconduct occurs off
campus or otherwise outside of its educational programs or activities.
In its interpretation of its proposed regulations, however, the Department of Education asserts,
“nothing in the proposed regulations would prevent a recipient from initiating a student
conduct proceeding or offering supportive measures to students who report sexual harassment
that occurs outside the recipient’s education program or activity.”25 But the proposed
regulation itself would prevent a college from initiating disciplinary proceedings under Title IX
against the respondent for behavior that occurred off campus by mandating dismissal of the
complaint.26
Pursuing such disciplinary proceedings against a respondent for behavior that did not occur in
an education program or activity may even subject a college to potential Title IX liability for
failure to dismiss the complaint under § 106.45(b)(3). The safe harbor provision in the
regulations states that following a process “consistent with § 106.45” in response to allegations
of sexual assault “does not otherwise constitute discrimination under title IX.”27 It thereby
implies that a failure to follow the process mandated by § 106.45—by, for instance, refusing to
dismiss a complaint that involves off campus behavior—could itself constitute discrimination
under Title IX.
The proposed regulations would place colleges in an impossible situation. They would require
colleges to close their eyes to a discriminatory educational environment, if it were caused by
sexual assault that happened outside an educational program or activity, or face the prospect
of significant liability for attempting to take remedial action in such a case.
Even if such institutional liability were not a threat, and colleges could discipline students for off
campus sexual assault outside of Title IX but through a process dictated by a general code of
conduct, discrepancies in how colleges adjudicate these complaints would erupt. For example,
under the proposed regulations, adjudicators who hear disciplinary cases of sexual misconduct

24

§ 106.45(b)(3).

25

Commentary I.A, at 26.

26

§ 106.45(b)(3).

27

§ 106.44(b)(1).
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under Title IX must be appropriately trained.28 Most colleges do not provide training on sexual
stereotypes, implicit bias, and sexual trauma to adjudicators who hear cases under a general
code of conduct, such as academic dishonesty or the underage consumption of alcohol. Forcing
colleges to process complaints of off campus sexual assault not under Title IX, but under a
general code of conduct, would increase the likelihood that these complaints would be heard
by adjudicators who have not received appropriate training.
If a sexual assault occurred on campus, the college would have to adjudicate the complaint
through the extensive and complex procedures mandated by the proposed regulations,
including training of the officials involved. If the same sexual assault occurred just one block off
campus, however, the college would have to adjudicate the complaint through a different
process dictated by a general code of conduct.
The Title IX protections for parties involved in allegations of sexual misconduct should attach if
the conduct denies equal educational opportunity, not depending on its location, nor whether
it happened within an educational program or activity.
If they identically deny students equal access to education, treating off campus sexual assault
differently from on campus sexual assault is arbitrary. It would create inconsistent outcomes
for indistinguishable conduct, deprive parties of due process protections under the regulations,
foster confusion regarding the rights and responsibilities of the parties involved, and occasion
unfairness to all. Treating off campus sexual assault differently from on campus sexual assault is
also contrary to longstanding caselaw in this area, which makes clear that it is not about where
the assault took place but rather about whether the assault denied the victim equal access to
education.29
The regulations should indicate that Title IX covers sexual harassment that denies equal access
to educational opportunities, regardless of whether the harassment occurs on or off campus.

28

§ 106.45(b)(1)(iii).

29

See, e.g., Crandell v. N.Y. College of Osteopathic Medicine, 87 F. Supp. 2d 304, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (off campus
nature of conduct was not a bar to sexual harassment claim, where the off campus incidents “made her feel
frightened and uncomfortable and consequently caused her to miss her anatomy class”); Kelly v. Yale Univ., No.
Civ.A. 3:01–CV–1591, 2003 WL 1563424, at *3 (finding that even the mere potential for an encounter, between a
student raped off campus and her attacker “could create an environment sufficiently hostile to deprive the victim
of access to educational opportunities”); Doe ex rel. Doe v. Derby Bd. Of Educ., 451 F. Supp. 2d 438, 444 (D. Conn.
2006) (“Thus, even absent actual post-assault harassment by [off campus rapist], the fact that he and plaintiff
attended school together can be found to constitute . . . harassment.”).
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III.

The Department of Education’s Proposed Title IX Regulation §§ 106.44(a) & (e)(6),
Requiring Actual Knowledge for Recipient Responsibility, Would Decrease Safety
and Equality on Our Campuses.

Previous guidance from the Department of Education indicated, “A school is responsible for
addressing harassment incidents about which it knows or reasonably should have known.”30
This “knew or should have known” standard has been applied by the Department of Education
in administrative enforcement proceedings under Title IX for at least twenty years. It is the
same standard that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) uses when
analyzing a range of harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.31
The proposed regulations, however, would change the standard from “knew or should have
known” to require “actual knowledge” of allegations of harassment reported to a “Title IX
Coordinator or any official of the recipient who has the authority to institute corrective
measures.”32 The incentives created by these two rules directly conflict. In order to avoid
liability, a “knew or should have known” standard encourages colleges to acquire knowledge of
sexual harassment on their campuses from every institutional actor who “should have known.”
By contrast, an “actual knowledge” standard discourages colleges from acquiring actual
knowledge of sexual harassment on their campuses, in order to avoid liability.
The proposed regulations would thereby discourage colleges from identifying and training
responsible employees who have a duty to report harassment to the Title IX coordinator, which
is a proven and effective strategy for discovering, handling, and preventing sexual harassment
and discrimination. Higher education in general, and CUNY in particular, has undergone a
culture shift in how it addresses sexual harassment by designating responsible employees in our
policies, training them about their obligations to report to their campus Title IX coordinators,
and creating accountability structures to reinforce those expectations. The assignment of
responsible employees is woven into the fabric of New York State’s “Enough Is Enough” law.
These investments have paid off. Across CUNY, Title IX coordinators report that the designation
of responsible employees has helped develop a shared sense of responsibility for the campus
climate among faculty and staff, and a broader sense of student safety.
When CUNY’s responsible employees fulfill their obligations to report, they provide our
institutions with valuable information about issues on our campuses, enabling our colleges to
investigate and address those issues promptly and equitably. This source of information is
30

U.S. Dept. of Educ., OCR, Dear Colleague Letter: Harassment and Bullying 2 (2010) (withdrawn).

31

See https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/harassment.cfm (“The employer will be liable for harassment by nonsupervisory employees or non-employees over whom it has control (e.g., independent contractors or customers on
the premises), if it knew, or should have known about the harassment and failed to take prompt and appropriate
corrective action”).
32

§§ 106.44(a) & 106.44(e)(6).
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particularly vital to our prevention efforts, given the vast body of research showing that the
“least common response” to experiencing harassment is to take formal action to report the
harassment internally or to file a legal complaint.33
In our experience, mandatory reporting by responsible employees has been a critical part of our
efforts to create productive learning and working environments on our campuses that fulfill our
educational mission. The proposed regulations would contravene Title IX’s statutory purpose by
discouraging institutions from making use of this proven best practice for identifying and
preventing harassment and discrimination. A system of clear expectations and accountability is
key to creating an inclusive culture and preventing harassment.34 Indeed, in a 2016 report, the
EEOC found that workplace culture, reinforced through systems of expectations and
accountability, “has the greatest impact on allowing harassment to flourish, or conversely, in
preventing harassment.”35
By discouraging institutions from acquiring “actual knowledge” of sexual harassment, and thus
from using a responsible employee framework, the proposed regulations would inhibit colleges
from using a proven tool for creating inclusive teaching, learning, and working environments.
The proposed regulations would thereby significantly undermine Title IX’s goal of eliminating
discrimination in federally funded education programs.
The risk that an “actual notice” standard would undermine Title IX’s intent is particularly acute
at large institutions such as CUNY. The proposed regulations would so narrowly define those
employees whose actual knowledge triggers an institution’s Title IX obligations that the vast
majority of students at large campuses would never even come into contact with those few
individuals who must receive reports of sexual harassment.
Comparing the list of CUNY employees who are responsible employees (and thus mandatory
reporters of sexual misconduct to their Title IX coordinators) under current law and policy, to
the list of employees whose knowledge would trigger Title IX obligations under the proposed
regulations vividly illustrates the problem. Under current CUNY policy, consistent with New
York State’s “Enough Is Enough” law, responsible employees include the following diverse set of
faculty and staff members who are involved in all aspects of academic and student life:
•
•
•

Title IX Coordinator and her/his staff;
Office of Public Safety employees;
Vice President for Student Affairs and Dean of Students and staff in those offices;

33

See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Select Task Force on the Study of Harassment in the
Workplace: Report of Co-Chairs Chai R. Feldblum & Victoria A. Lipnic v & 3-25(2016) (available at
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_force/harassment/upload/report.pdf) (hereinafter “EEOC Select Task Force
Report”).
34

Id.

35

Id. at v & 31-37.
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Residence Life staff in CUNY owned or operated housing, including Resident Assistants;
Human Resources staff;
College President, Vice Presidents, and Deans;
Athletics Staff;
Faculty Athletics Representatives;
Department Chairpersons/Executive officers;
University Office of the General Counsel employees;
College attorney and her/his staff;
College labor designee and her/his staff;
International Education Liaisons/Study Abroad Campus Directors and Field Directors;
Faculty and staff members when they are leading or supervising off campus trips;
Faculty or staff advisors to student groups;
Employees who are managers or supervisors;
SEEK/College Discovery staff;
College Childcare Center staff;
Directors of “Educational Opportunity Centers” affiliated with CUNY colleges; and
Faculty or staff academic advisors.

By contrast, under the proposed regulations, the only CUNY employees who would trigger the
institution’s Title IX obligations are:
•
•

The Title IX Coordinator; and
The College President (the only “official of the recipient who has authority to institute
corrective measures” in response to sexual harassment).36

Importantly, the proposed regulations omit the very faculty and staff members who work daily
and directly with students in the normal course of their college experiences, as well as the
CUNY responsible employees who are mandatory reporters. As the Commentary to the
proposed regulations indicates, “the mere ability or obligation to report sexual harassment
does not qualify an employee, even if that employee is an official, as one who has authority to
institute corrective measures on behalf of the recipient.”37
Not even the Chief Diversity Officer on campus has the authority to institute corrective
measures independent of the college president. Only two eligible officials, the Title IX
Coordinator and the President, who generally do not work daily and directly with students,
would need “actual knowledge” of a specific allegation of sexual harassment before an
institution had any obligation to act to protect a student under Title IX. This approach would

36

§ 106.44(e)(6). This language would include the highest academic officer of a freestanding school, such as the
Dean of a law school or other professional school.
37

Commentary I.A, at 18. See also id. at 22.
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result in less effective prevention efforts, less timely information given to the institution’s Title
IX office, and less safe campuses.
Two examples illustrate the “actual knowledge” problem:
Example 1: A student reports to her physics professor that she is being sexually harassed
by her biology professor, a star researcher and the largest grant recipient at the college.
The student explains that she works in the biology professor’s lab as an assistant and
the harassment happens after hours in that lab. The physics professor reports the
situation to the dean of the school of sciences. The dean replies that no one else must
know about the situation because the star biology professor is too valuable to the
school. Neither the dean nor the physics professor informs the Title IX coordinator or
the college president. The student drops both her biology and physics classes as a result.
Despite the fact that the student experienced sexual harassment by a faculty member,
told another professor about the harassment, experienced unequal access to
educational opportunities as a result, and despite the fact that the dean should have
informed the college Title IX coordinator but chose to silence the information instead,
the student would have no claim under Title IX.
Example 2: A college student tells his tennis coach that he was raped by a teammate
when they were on the road together travelling to an away game. The student is so
traumatized by the experience that he drops the tennis team and his grades suffer. The
coach tells the student that he must have sent mixed signals to his teammate, and then
encourages him to tell no one else but to forget that it ever happened. Despite the fact
that the student experienced rape as a member of a college sports team, told his coach
about the rape, experienced unequal access to educational opportunities as a result,
and despite the fact that the college should have known about the situation but the
coach silenced the complaint, the student would have no claim under Title IX.
These examples would have come out differently under the Department of Education’s prior
guidance on Title IX and under current CUNY policy. They show how the practical result of the
proposed regulations would contravene the goals of Title IX. Under proposed regulations, the
Department of Education would find that, despite their willful blindness to the students
harassed by a biology professor or raped by a teammate, as well as their willful blindness to the
ongoing risk that the biology professor and teammate posed to others, the colleges had fulfilled
their Title IX obligations.
Under the proposed regulations, even if a high-level college employee directly observed sexual
assault, that employee would not be obligated to tell the college and the college would be
under no obligation to investigate.
Such counter-intuitive results would undermine the trust and confidence of students, faculty,
and staff in their colleges. These groups would no longer be assured that notifying one of the
many authority figures who work with students on a daily basis (and are perceived to have the
13
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duty to report sexual harassment and assault) would facilitate an appropriate investigation and
institutional response.
Rather than creating incentives for institutions of higher education to establish organizational
expectations and accountability structures that promote information-sharing and enable them
promptly to investigate and address sexual misconduct, the proposed regulations would create
incentives for institutions of higher education to practice willful blindness, evading potential
liability by avoiding acquiring information about sexual misconduct on their campuses. These
incentives would dramatically reduce the scope of protections available to students who have
experienced sexual harassment and assault, contrary to the goal of Title IX.
Instead of requiring actual knowledge, the regulations should focus on whether a college “knew
or should have known” about an allegation of unwelcome sexual behavior that denies a student
access to equal education. A “knew or should have known” standard would encourage
reporting, keep Title IX in line with other civil rights statutes, such as Title VII, and enhance
safety and equality on college campuses.
IV.

Department of Education’s Proposed Title IX Regulation § 106.45(b)(4)(i),
Requiring That a Recipient Apply the Same Standard of Evidence for Complaints
against Students as It Does for Complaints against Employees, Including Faculty,
Would Undermine Equality on Our Campuses.

CUNY believes that the standard of proof in campus disciplinary proceedings adjudicating
sexual misconduct claims should be preponderance of the evidence—exactly the standard that
is used for sexual harassment claims in civil court, and exactly the standard of proof that has
been used in most college campus disciplinary proceedings for non-sexual claims of
misconduct.38 Prior Department of Education guidance mandated that colleges apply the
preponderance of the evidence standard in disciplinary proceedings adjudicating sexual
misconduct,39 with good reason.
Preponderance of the evidence is the standard that addresses the parties equally in relation to
one another. Whoever has a superiority in weight of evidence (the “preponderance” of the
evidence) can prevail in the disciplinary proceeding. This standard has no preconceived
assumption about the responsibility of either party for the incident, and no greater burden on
either party.

38

Historically, of those campuses that identified a standard of proof in their student disciplinary codes, 80%
identified preponderance of evidence. Heather Karjane, et al., Campus Sexual Assault: How America’s Institutions
of Higher Education Respond, U.S. Dep’t Just. 120 (2002). The exception to the preponderance standard appears to
have been in the Ivy League, which tended to use a clear and convincing standard.
39

U.S. Dept. Educ. OCR, Dear Colleague Letter 11 (2011) (withdrawn).
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By contrast, the proposed regulations allow colleges to use either a “preponderance of
evidence” standard or a “clear and convincing” standard in hearings under Title IX. To meet the
higher “clear and convincing” standard of proof, one must prove that something is highly and
substantially more probable than not to be true.
Not only do the proposed regulations allow colleges to adopt the clear and convincing standard
of proof, they also mandate a “presumption that the respondent is not responsible for the
alleged conduct,”40 creating a presumption in favor of (predominately male) respondents,
which places a greater burden for proving the allegations on colleges, and implicitly, on
(predominately female) complainants.
The proposed regulations also mandate that colleges “must apply the same standard of
evidence for complaints against students as it does for complaints against employees, including
faculty.”41 Prior Department of Education guidance had no such mandate.
The Department of Education explains that this proposed regulation is required “to avoid the
specially disfavored treatment of student respondents in comparison to respondents who are
employees such as faculty members, who often have superior leverage as a group in extracting
guarantees of protection under a recipient’s disciplinary procedures.”42
Public institutions of higher education are more likely to have unionized employees, including
tenured faculty, who have engaged in collective bargaining.43 Collective bargaining agreements
between colleges and employees regarding the standard of evidence to be used in employee
disciplinary proceedings often adopt a “clear and convincing” standard. Colleges who have
agreed to collective bargaining on this matter cannot force employees or unions to renegotiate
or change their agreements. Obviously, negotiating a change to a college’s collective bargaining
agreement would be costly and time-consuming, and there would be no guarantee of the
outcome. Certain provisions of the collective bargaining agreement may also be required by
state statute, such as tenure.
Under the proposed regulations, therefore, if a college’s collective bargaining agreement
includes the clear and convincing standard of evidence for employee disciplinary proceedings,
and the student evidentiary standard for disciplinary proceedings is preponderance of the
evidence, a college would be forced to change the student standard to clear and convincing as
well, even when doing so would be inappropriate in the academic judgment of college
leadership, considering the unique needs of the community.
40

§ 106.45(b)(1)(iv).

41

§ 106.45(4)(i).

42

Commentary II.C, at 63.

43

Nick Gier, An Update on Unions in Higher Education, Idaho St. J., Sept. 2, 2018 (unions represent 35% of public
universities and 21% of private universities).
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The proposed regulations conflate student disciplinary proceedings with employee disciplinary
proceedings. However, the relationship that a student has with a college is not symmetrical to
the relationship between an employee and a college.
Students pay tuition to enroll in college to acquire the knowledge, skills, and social and personal
development that will allow them to obtain jobs and become thoughtful, well-informed
contributors to society. Colleges have an affirmative obligation to create educational
environments conducive to those goals.
A college’s employees, by contrast, provide services to the college, principally for the benefit of
the students who attend, and the college pays employees for their services. Many fulltime
faculty members enjoy protective life tenure, and many fulltime staff members at public and/or
unionized colleges hold administrative permanency.
In light of colleges’ obligation to students, the purpose of student misconduct proceedings must
be both disciplinary and educational, unlike such proceedings for employees. While all
employees have the right to a workplace free from discrimination, the college has no
affirmative obligation to encourage an employee’s social and personal development. As a
result, the evidentiary standard applied in employee disciplinary matters should have no
bearing on student sexual misconduct adjudications.
Moreover, the proposed regulations would often require campuses to bring campus sexual
harassment cases out of line with the standard of proof used in other student disciplinary
proceedings. Singling out sexual harms against students for a higher standard of proof is itself in
conflict with Title IX: It would create special burdens on students who experience sexual
misconduct (disproportionately female and poor) as compared with students who face
misconduct that is not sexual. By favoring higher standards of proof for sexual harassment
cases, the proposed regulations would establish gendered barriers to equal access to
education.
Instead of allowing campuses to use either a preponderance of the evidence or a clear and
convincing standard, and mandating the latter on some, unionized campuses, the proposed
regulations should require the preponderance of the evidence standard as the most equitable
to students in disciplinary proceedings resolving allegations of sexual harassment.
V.

The Department of Education’s Proposed Title IX Regulations § 106.45(a)-(b),
Mandating Prohibitively Complex and Expensive Grievance Procedures, Would
Decrease Equality on Our Campuses.

Some aspects of the required grievance procedures in the proposed regulations are fair,
equitable, and essential to due process. CUNY agrees in principle with requirements for
published procedures, notice of allegations, equitable treatment of complainant and
respondent, equal opportunity to present witnesses and evidence, an objective assessment of
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the facts, a prohibition on conflicts of interest, the training of decision-makers and other
employees involved, and reasonably prompt timeframes.44
However, the proposed grievance procedures are prohibitively complex and burdensome. Their
innumerable requirements are unfair, both to complainants and to institutions of higher
education. Myriad, minute requirements would dictate college behavior, overwhelmingly in
ways that favor (predominately male) respondents over (predominately female) complainants.
Many of the ideas for heightened process in grievance procedures in favor of respondents came
from professors teaching in resource-rich law schools.45 Underfunded, public colleges and
universities across the country, the vast majority of which have no law schools attached to
them, will not have the resources to carry out the regulations’ complex mandates, which would
unfairly expose them to heightened Title IX liability compared to their better-funded
counterparts.
To call the proposed regulations’ grievance procedures onerous would be an understatement.
There are more than 100 requirements imposed upon institutions of higher education for the
process of investigations and formal hearings.46 Instead of relying on the academic judgment of
educational institutions, the proposed regulations impose multipart, impracticable
obligations.
CUNY strongly objects to the sheer volume and detail of the many added requirements in the
proposed grievance procedures. Many of these requirements do little to nothing to enhance
fairness or due process; at the same time, they add substantial complexity and cost, making
compliance practically impossible for under-resourced institutions.
For example, why should the written disposition in a student disciplinary proceeding resolving
an allegation of sexual harassment recite every procedural step that the Title IX officer took
throughout the entire investigation, before the hearing was even held: “from the receipt of the
complaint through the determination, including any notifications to the parties, interviews with
parties and witnesses, site visits, methods used to gather evidence, and hearings held”?47 This is
a level of detail in written dispositions not required of federal judges.
The proposed regulations go on to require additionally that decision-makers’ written
dispositions include: “findings of fact supporting the determination,” “conclusions regarding the
44

See, e.g., §§ 106.45(b)(1)(i), (ii), (iii), (v), & (b)(3)(ii).

45

See, e.g., Yale Law Prof. Jed Rubenfeld, Mishandling Rape, N.Y.T., Nov. 15, 2014; Eugene Volokh, Open Letter by
16 Penn Law School Professors about Title IX and Sexual Assault Complaints, Wash Post, Feb. 19, 2015; Jamie
Halper, Harvard Law School Faculty Call for Title IX Sexual Assault Policy Changes, Harvard Crimson, Sept. 1, 2017.
46

See §§ 106.8(b)(2)(ii)(c); 106.45(a)-(b)(7)(ii).

47

§ 106.45(b)(4)(ii)(B).
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application of the recipient’s policy to the facts,” “a statement of, and rationale for, the result
as to each allegation, including the determination regarding responsibility, any sanction the
recipient imposes on the respondent, and any remedies provided by the recipient to the
complainant designed to restore or preserve access to the recipient’s education program or
activity;” the procedures for appeal, and the permissible bases for appeal.48 None of these
possible features of written dispositions in disciplinary proceedings is objectionable on its own,
to be sure. They are standard fare for lawyers and judges. But they should not each be required
of a layperson, a college employee in student affairs, for instance, drafted to the role of
decision-maker to adjudicate one case, especially when most sitting trial court judges do not
issue written decisions with this level of detail, and no one claims that due process was
compromised. To impose these kinds of detailed requirements on colleges is arbitrary and
unduly burdensome.
These detailed requirements are also not required under the Violence Against Women Act or
the Clery Act for determinations of equally or more serious student misconduct, such as assault,
arson, or kidnaping. Many of the proposed requirements in the grievance procedures would not
meaningfully advance the core fairness of the proceedings or the due process of the parties,
but they would create an enormous administrative burden. They would be unwieldy, especially
for public colleges and other lesser resourced institutions
In short, many of the myriad requirements in the proposed grievance procedures are all cost
and no benefit. They substantially increase administrative burdens, while altogether failing to
advance the core fairness of the proceedings or the due process of the parties.
In addition to objecting to the overall number and complexity of the requirements in the
proposed regulations, CUNY will discuss in detail its objections to five specific requirements in
the grievance procedures.
1) Attorneys or Advisors: Colleges must provide both the complainant and the respondent
with attorneys or advisors.49
The proposed regulations require colleges to provide both the complainant and the respondent
with attorneys or advisors who are able to function as attorneys for the mandated live hearing
and mandated cross-examination process.50 Low- and moderate-income students, like those at
48

§ 106.45(b)(4)(ii)(C)-(F).

49

§ 106.45(b)(3)(vii).

50

§ 106.45(b)(3)(vii). For higher educational institutions in New York, the proposed regulations on the need to
provide both parties with advocates may initially appear to mirror the state law “Enough Is Enough” requirement
that, if requested, both parties must be provided an advisor. (State of New York. Article 129-B. 14 June 2015).
However, the proposed regulation is different because the advocate’s role would not be limited to providing
information to the student on the technical aspects of the disciplinary process, as it is in New York State law. (§
106.45(b)(3) (iv) & (vii)). Rather the proposed process is adversarial, as described above.
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CUNY, will ordinarily not have the financial resources to hire their own attorneys or advisors for
these proceedings.
It will be difficult for colleges to fulfill this mandate. In our experience, it is already difficult to
find college employees willing to work as volunteer advisors in Title IX cases. It would be
extremely difficult for colleges to find employees who would be willing to function as actual
attorneys in these cases, required to, for instance, cross-examine alleged sexual assault victims
during live disciplinary proceedings. Colleges would instead be compelled to incur considerable
expense to hire outside advocates for the hearings.
Under the proposed regulations, colleges would need either to hire actual attorneys or to hire
lay advisors and train them on techniques for casting doubt on a student’s credibility, which is
the function of cross-examination. Such hiring and training would be costly. Lesser endowed
public colleges, like those at CUNY, do not have the financial resources to hire attorneys or to
hire and train advisors who would function as attorneys for both of the parties in each of these
disputes.
If one party has hired an attorney, the college may also be required to hire a licensed attorney
for the opposing party to ensure parity between them. Otherwise, if a lawyer questions one
student and a non-lawyer advisor questions the opposing party, the financial disparity between
them would result in inequality in the proceedings.
Instead of requiring colleges to hire attorneys or to hire and train advisors to function as
attorneys in live hearings, colleges should be required to appoint advisors, if requested by
either party, whose role is limited to providing information to the student on the technical
aspects of the disciplinary process, as is required in New York State’s “Enough Is Enough” law.51
In New York public colleges, this arrangement works well.
2) Cross-Examination: Colleges must provide for cross-examination of the parties and
witnesses by attorneys or advisors in a live hearing.52
Under prior Department of Education guidance, direct cross-examination by attorneys or
advocates was impermissible because it was understood to threaten complainants and to deter
accurate reports of sexual harassment.53 Under previous guidance, parties were permitted to
submit questions to a neutral hearing officer who then would ask the questions of the parties.54

51

N.Y.S. Educ. Law, Art. 129-B (2015).

52

§ 106.45(b)(3)(vii).

53

U.S. Dept. Educ. OCR, Dear Colleague Letter 31 (2011); U.S. Dept. Educ. OCR, Questions & Answers on Title IX &
Sexual Violence § F-6 (2014) (both withdrawn).
54

U.S. Dept. Educ. OCR, Questions & Answers on Title IX & Sexual Violence § F-6 (2014) (withdrawn).

19
Published by The Keep, 2019

19

Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 0, Iss. 14 [2019], Art. 43

Many courts have found that the parties received fairness and due process through questioning
by a neutral hearing officer.55
Under the proposed regulations, however, the questioning process would become direct and
adversarial, involving the actual cross-examination of witnesses and parties.56 The complainant
would be questioned not by a neutral hearing officer or a neutral investigator, but directly by
an attorney or a trained advocate for the respondent. The attorney or trained advocate would
question parties and witnesses with the intent of undermining their stories or painting them as
biased or responsible for wrongdoing. This kind of probing by advocates would intimidate
student witnesses, revictimize complainants, and deter them both from participating in
investigations, perversely undermining the very search for truth that the regulations purport to
advance.
Moreover, under the proposed regulations, colleges may “not limit the choice of advisor.”57
Parties may therefore choose to have a parent or a classmate function as an advisor. The
parent of a complainant or respondent would then have the regulation-sanctioned authority to
question their child’s accuser or alleged assailant. The best friend of the respondent could
directly cross-examine the complainant, or vice versa. A legitimate fear of being questioned by
the parent or best friend of the opposing party, or another individual partial to the opposing
side, would deter victims from filing formal complaints and discourage witnesses from
participating in hearings.
Instead of mandating direct cross-examination in a live hearing, the regulations should allow
parties to submit their questions to neutral hearing officers.
3) All Evidence Review: Colleges must “provide both parties an equal opportunity to
inspect and review any evidence obtained as part of the investigation that is directly
related to the allegations raised in a formal complaint, including evidence upon which
the recipient does not intend to rely in reaching a determination regarding
responsibility.”58
Under the proposed regulations, all evidence related to an incident that the investigator ever
receives or obtains as part of the investigation must be turned over to both parties, no matter
how irrelevant, inflammatory, distracting, or prejudicial. This kind of all evidence review would
even include evidence related to the prior sexual history of the complainant or other witnesses
that could not be relied upon in reaching a determination.
55

See, e.g., Haidak v. U. Mass. Amherst, 299 F. Supp. 3d 242, 262 (D. Mass. 2018).

56

U.S. Dept. Educ. OCR, Dear Colleague Letter 31 (2011) (withdrawn); U.S. Dept. Educ. OCR, Questions & Answers
on Title IX & Sexual Violence § F-6 (2014) (withdrawn).
57

§ 106.45(b)(3)(iv).

58

§ 106.45(b)(3)(viii).
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The proposed regulations are clear that the complainant’s prior sexual history would be
excluded from the hearing itself.59 However, if information about the prior sexual history of the
parties or witnesses were somewhere in the evidence that the Title IX coordinator received
during an investigation, as it often is, it would have to be disclosed to both parties as part of the
all evidence review.
The disclosure of this kind of evidence could lead to the publication of sensitive and private
materials of either party or non-parties, the public disparagement or harassment of either party
or non-parties, and retaliation against either party or non-parties. The requirement that all
evidence must be turned over to both parties would dissuade both witnesses and complainants
from providing evidence to investigators, as they would recognize that evidence would be
turned over to respondents, regardless of how the investigators assessed the evidence. The
resultant withholding of information would decrease the accuracy of investigations.
The negative effects of an all evidence review would most commonly befall complainants. The
scope of the mandated disclosure in an all evidence review would be experienced as harassing
itself, and would deter complainants from pursuing formal charges.
The proposed regulations mandate an unprecedented amount of evidence disclosure. They are
broader that the scope of discovery in a civil case, which limits discovery to nonprivileged and
relevant information, and allows for nondisclosure when the burden of discovery outweighs its
benefits.60 The proposed regulations mandating disclosure of evidence are also broader than
the disclosure required in criminal cases, when life and liberty are at stake, which requires the
prosecution to provide the defendant with only exculpatory evidence,61 rather than all the
evidence ever collected in a case. The proposed regulations are therefore arbitrary and
unprecedented.
Instead of requiring an all evidence review by both parties, the proposed regulations should
require that colleges provide both parties with an equal opportunity to inspect the evidence
presented in the investigative report or hearing.

59

§ 106.45(b)(3)(vii).

60

Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1) (“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any
party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at
stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’
resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the
proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible
in evidence to be discoverable.”).
61

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (disallowing “suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused” because it violates due process “where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment”).
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4) Digital Evidence Review: Prior to the completion of an investigative report, a college
“must send to each party and the party’s advisor, if any, the evidence subject to
inspection and review in an electronic format, such as a file sharing platform, that
restricts parties and advisors from downloading or copying the evidence.”62
The proposed regulations require that colleges must deliver all gathered evidence in digital
format to both parties. Nothing of the sort has ever been required by the Department of
Education under Title IX, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require digital
discovery in civil cases. CUNY objects to this unprecedented requirement.
Underfunded institutions of higher education do not have the resources to digitize all the
evidence in each case and share it with the parties in an electronic format. A lot of the evidence
in disciplinary cases is collected in hard copy, in printed form. A lot of evidence is digital already,
but not in a consistent format for sharing on a group platform. It would be costly to digitize all
physical documents and systematize the digital format of all disparate digital materials and
then upload them all to a system to share with the parties. There would be no benefit to such
an arrangement, while the financial costs to colleges would be substantial.
Moreover, the potential psychological costs of mandated digital review would be extreme. If all
evidence in a case were provided to the parties in digital form, it could be easily and widely
shared. Often in cases involving sexual harassment or sexual assault, the email and text
communication between parties is charged, unusual, or sexualized. If colleges must provide all
evidence to both parties, there is no way for the college to ensure that it would not be shared
with others, for instance, on social media.
Sharing personal text messages or communications on social media can be traumatic, and it
may expose sensitive information about the parties or non-parties. Once parties are made
aware that all evidence collected will be provided to both parties in digital form, and there is a
risk that one of the parties may have it leaked, publish in a newspaper, print it on flyers, email
it, or post it on social media, complainants will be much less likely to file Title IX complaints.
Potential leaks of sensitive information related to the case can also harm respondents, as well
as non-parties, including witnesses who will be less likely to agree to participate in
investigations. Digital transmission of all evidence collected in a case is a tool of potential
harassment and mischief.
The regulations assert that institutions will somehow provide all the digital evidence “in an
electronic format, such as a file sharing platform, that restricts the parties and advisors from
downloading or copying the evidence.”63 The notion that there is a format that allows someone
to view information digitally, but not copy it, is utterly fanciful. A cell phone can photograph a
computer screen of evidence in less than a second for a ready, public post to social media.
62

§ 106.45(b)(3)(viii).

63

Id.
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Instead of requiring that all evidence be sent to the parties in digital format, the proposed
regulations should require that colleges provide both parties with an equal opportunity to
inspect the evidence presented in the investigative report or hearing, when such inspection is
supervised by a college official to ensure that evidence is not copied for public distribution.
5) Rules of Evidence Training: “The decision-maker must explain to the party’s advisor
asking cross-examination questions any decision to exclude questions as not relevant.”64
The proposed regulations require the decision-maker to explain the exclusion of certain
evidence from the hearing to the party’s advisor or attorney. This requirement raises concerns
regarding the training of both the decision-makers and the advisors.
In order to make the decision to exclude evidence, a decision-maker would have to be trained
sufficiently in the rules of evidence for exclusion. The college would have a very hard time
finding a layperson with sufficient knowledge of evidence law to provide real time responses
and decisions to questions in a live, formal hearing. Based on our experience at CUNY, outside
of the law school, almost no college employees would be appropriate for that duty. Most
colleges would have to hire outside counsel or retired judges to serve as decision-makers in
these hearings. Most public colleges, and many private colleges, simply will not have the
resources to hire outside counsel or judges to conduct live hearings, nor will they have the
resources to hire and train laypersons to function as judges in live hearings. These proposed
regulations would be cost-prohibitive to lesser-resourced, public institutions.
The regulations should not require that the decision-maker in a hearing function as a judge and
explain to the party’s advisor any decision to exclude a question or other evidence; this level of
micro-management in disciplinary hearings is not required for due process.
6) Overall Negative Effect of Proposed Grievance Procedures
Overall, the grievance procedures in the proposed regulation are cumbersome, challenging, and
cost-prohibitive. Public colleges cannot afford to hire attorneys for both parties or to hire and
train advisors who function as attorneys for both parties or to hire and train decision-makers
who function as judges in each one of these disciplinary proceedings. Public colleges cannot
afford to digitize all evidence and deliver it to the parties, and the risks of doing so are too
great. These detailed requirements are not contained in New York State’s “Enough Is Enough”
law, and would impose new and unprecedented burdens on colleges throughout New York.
The requirements of direct cross-examination by attorneys or trained advisors for the opposing
parties, all-evidence review by both parties that includes evidence of the parties’ and nonparties’ prior sexual history, and digital evidence review that is easily copied and shared would
64

§ 106.45(b)(3)(vii).
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open the door to alarming harassment. The proposed regulations would engender fear,
especially on the part of complainants: fear of retaliation by the respondent or his friends, fear
of being questioned by the respondent’s attorney or trained advisor, and fear of
embarrassment or trauma because all evidence would be shared electronically and could not
be shielded from being exposed on social media. These regulations would deter victims of
sexual harassment from lodging formal complaints, discourage witnesses from participating in
investigations, erode confidence in the disciplinary system, imperil the privacy rights of all
involved, and degrade the educational mission of enhancing equal access to higher education.
For colleges, the grievance procedures would be prohibitively costly to implement, in terms of
financial investment, training, and time. The financial burden placed on colleges to provide
trained advocates and trained decision-makers for live hearings and the need to collect and
send all evidence digitally would drain limited time and financial resources.
Nevertheless, a safe harbor provision in the proposed regulations underscores the mandatory
nature of the detailed, innumerable requirements mapped out in the grievance procedures:
A recipient must follow procedures consistent with [the grievance procedures
defined in] section 106.45 in response to a formal complaint. If the recipient
follows procedures…consistent with section 106.45 in response to a formal
complaint, the recipient’s response to the formal complaint is not deliberately
indifferent and it does not otherwise constitute discrimination under title IX.65
This key provision implies that a failure to follow the grievance procedures mandated in the
proposed regulations could or would itself constitute discrimination under Title IX. This startling
provision appears to imply colleges’ automatic liability if they fail to follow the detailed
procedures required. Because the grievance procedures are so cumbersome, complex, and
technically precise, they will be hard not to violate. The grievance procedures would thereby
open colleges up to substantial liability.
Perversely, the complexity and cost of the grievance procedures in the proposed regulations
would encourage many colleges to do everything in their powers to avoid formal disciplinary
hearings. The proposed regulations thereby create powerful incentives for institutional actors
to persuade the parties to agree to informal resolution instead.
VI.

The Department of Education’s Proposed Title IX Regulation § 106.45(b)(6),
Providing for Informal Resolution of Complaints, Would Decrease Due Process for
Both Parties and Erode Equality on Our Campuses.

In contrast to the proposed regulations’ complex, technical, and costly formal grievance
procedures, the proposed regulations’ informal procedures lack detail. They simply require
65

§ 106.44(b)(1).

https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss14/43
DOI: 10.58188/1941-8043.1837

24
24

et al.: Panel: Title IX Revisited

notice of the allegations and the consequences of agreeing to informal process, and the parties’
written consent.66 If a college provides the required notice and obtains the parties’ written
consent, its actions in an informal process would fall within the safe harbor provision of the
regulations, which ensures, “the recipient’s response to the formal complaint is not deliberately
indifferent and it does not otherwise constitute discrimination under title IX.”67 So while the
formal grievance procedures open colleges up to considerable liability under Title IX due to the
potential for technical violations of protocol, the informal resolution process insulates
campuses from liability.
This insulation from potential liability creates a robust incentive for colleges to persuade the
parties to agree to an informal resolution process. The problem is that the informal resolution
process may be unfair to either complainants or respondents, and it may deny due process to
either or both sides.
Under the proposed regulations, informal resolution can happen:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Without any conflicts check to prevent bias on the part of mediators or institutional
actors drafted to resolve the complaint informally,
Without any training on sexual harassment of the institutional actors involved,
Without any investigation by a neutral investigator of facts surrounding the allegation,
Without any hearing by a neutral arbiter to determine those facts,
With any possible informal process or outcome for either party as a result, and
With a prohibition on returning to the formal adjudication process.

This kind of informal resolution would potentially expose students on either side to a range of
due process violations or unfairness, at the whim of the institution. Two examples suffice:
Example 1: A first-year student claims to have been sexually assaulted on campus by the
quarterback of the college’s celebrated football team. The first-year student lodges a
formal complaint against the quarterback with the Title IX coordinator. College staff
members are uncomfortable with the complaint and its potential for bad publicity, so
they lean on the complainant and respondent to agree to an informal resolution of the
situation. The parties agree, and the college president then asks the football coach to
mediate. The coach takes the parties to a private room, yells at them that they are
equally responsible for the situation, and demands that they apologize to each another.
The complainant runs out of the room, highly distraught, and drops out of college as a
result.
Example 2: A first-year student claims to have been sexually assaulted on campus by the
quarterback of the college’s celebrated football team. The first-year student lodges a
66

§ 106.45(b)(6)(i)-(ii).
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formal complaint against the quarterback with the Title IX coordinator. College staff
members are uncomfortable with the complaint and its potential for bad publicity, so
they lean on the complainant and respondent to agree to an informal resolution of the
situation. The parties agree, and the college president hires the complainant’s aunt, an
employee in the department of student affairs, to mediate. The aunt takes the parties to
a private room, does not listen to either side, tells the football player he is a horrible
person, and simply boots him from the football team. The respondent runs out of the
room, highly distraught, and drops out of college as a result.
These examples would have come out differently under the Department of Education’s prior
guidance on Title IX, which did not allow for this kind of informal resolution. They show how the
practical result of establishing an informal resolution option with no requirements to protect
the rights of the parties could erode the due process rights of either side. The proposed
regulations delineate complex requirements in formal grievance procedures, which will
powerfully encourage informal resolution of complaints, and which will, ironically, eliminate all
the process protections mandated in the formal grievance procedures.
VII.

Department of Education’s Proposed Title IX Regulations Turn Title IX on Its Head.

The proposed regulations repeatedly articulate a false equivalence under Title IX between the
complainant and respondent in a manner contrary to the text and purpose of Title IX.68 For
example, the beginning of the grievance procedures section states:
A recipient’s treatment of a complainant in response to a formal complaint of
sexual harassment may constitute discrimination on the basis of sex under title
IX. A recipient’s treatment of the respondent may also constitute discrimination
on the basis of sex under title IX.69
While it is true that a school’s treatment of a respondent could constitute sex discrimination
under Title IX, under prior Department of Education guidance and caselaw, it would require
unusual evidence of unfairness for a school to be found to violate a respondent’s Title IX rights

68

Title IX was designed to benefit those who are excluded from educational opportunities, not turn a blind eye to
historic discrimination. See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe, 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (“It is Title IX’s ‘unmistakable focus on the
benefited class,’ rather than the perpetrator, that, in petitioner’s view, compels the conclusion that the statute
works to protect students from the discriminatory misconduct of their peers”); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155,
176 (1st Cir. 1996) (“Title IX and its implementing regulations protect the class for whose special benefit the
statute was enacted . . . It is women and not men who have historically and who continue to be underrepresented
in sports, not only at Brown, but at universities nationwide”); Williams v. Sch. Dist. of Bethlehem, Pa., 998 F.2d 168,
176 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[A]lthough [T]itle IX and the regulation apply equally to boys as well as girls, it would require
blinders to ignore that the motivation for promulgation of the regulation on athletics was the historic emphasis on
boys’ athletics programs to the exclusion of girls’ athletics programs”).
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in its response to a single complaint.70 The Department of Justice now appears to disagree,
however.
Its commentary to the proposed grievance procedures contends, “a respondent can be
unjustifiably separated from his or her education on the basis of sex, in violation of Title IX, if
the recipient does not investigate and adjudicate using fair procedures before imposing
discipline.”71 This language once again suggests that a failure to follow the grievance
procedures in the proposed regulations would itself constitute a per se violation of Title IX.
On the one hand, the proposed regulations impose a deliberate indifference standard on
institutional actions toward the complainant. The complainant has no right to an investigation
of sexual harassment that happens outside an education program or activity,72 no right to an
investigation if the complaint is not lodged with the Title IX coordinator or the president of the
college,73 no right to any particular “determination of responsibility,”74 and no right to “any
particular sanction against the respondent.”75 None of those things constitute even a potential
violation of Title IX under the proposed regulations.
On the other hand, the proposed regulations do not impose a deliberate indifference standard
on institutional actions toward the respondent. Indeed, any deviation from a strict and onerous
set of grievance procedures designed to protect respondents may violate Title IX itself. The safe
harbor provisions likewise clarify that, under the proposed regulations, the Title IX review by
the Department of Education would focus on grievance process violations in favor of
respondents rather than on substantive outcomes for victims of sexual harassment.
The proposed regulations radically change the civil rights statute, turning Title IX on its head.
They would both reduce liability, with respect to how campuses respond to complaints of
sexual harassment and sexual assault, and expand liability, with respect to how campuses carry
out a set of mandatory, detailed grievance procedures in favor of respondents. The proposed
regulations would unreasonably diminish institutional liability for sex discrimination, which is
the purpose of Title IX, while exposing institutions to unprecedented liability from accused
students. The proposed regulations would undermine the very statute they are purportedly
designed to carry out.
70

See, e.g., OCR, Students Accused of Sexual Misconduct Had Title IX Rights Violated by Wesley College, Says U.S.
Department of Education (October 12, 2016) (finding “an interim suspension … imposed the same day as the
college received the report against the student” and failure to ever interview the respondent violated Title IX).
71

Commentary II, at 40.
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§ 106.44(a).
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§ 106.44(a) and § 106.44(e)(6).

74

Commentary II, at 37.

75

Id. at 68.
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Conclusion
CUNY is a unique institution, with an important mission and a diverse, striving student body. A
core part of our mission is to protect and expand our disproportionately impoverished
students’ equal access to educational opportunities. The civil rights statute Title IX should be of
great help to CUNY in that effort. Unfortunately, the Department of Education’s proposed
regulations would undermine the statute and arbitrarily hinder our efforts.
The proposed regulations would unnecessarily deter CUNY students from lodging legitimate
complaints of sexual harassment, deter them from coming forward as witnesses in the
investigations of such complaints, and decrease our ability to protect our students from sex
discrimination. If the proposed regulations were implemented, college campuses across the
country would become less safe and less equal.
At the same time, the proposed regulations would create incentives for colleges across the
country to try to avoid the cumbersome and expensive procedures mandated by the formal
grievance process and instead urge students to agree to undergo informal resolution, where
they would be guaranteed neither due process nor basic fairness.
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